Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Cisco. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Cisco. Afficher tous les articles

Layer 2 Security Issues and Their Mitigation

So, I have left Accenture and have joined the red team of a Big 4; & below is my first presentation which I have given there (redacted completely; obviously).

Comments are very much welcome.



~ lundi 6 juillet 2015 0 commentaires

My time with Cisco EX90

Got my hands on Cisco EX90 (that was malfunctioning) & here is my impression of it - sucks balls.

The box has poor support for rs232 , has a special cable provided separately (USB to serial) without which it won't jack up on console at all. Yes I tried everything & the damn thing needs a specific ft232r driver to make it work. Speed settings are 38400 with no flow control & parity, post which the sucker boots up in admin mode with xConfig disabled. Now vendor nowadays have a very pragmatic approach to make CLI as difficult for the folks they intended to create. They tackle this problem by creating pseudo-shells (with limited capabilities,generally have limited to no debug facility, sometimes you really feel lucky if you are able to read proper logs ) which miserably fail to provide full view of what the heck is wrong with the device/service. The Result? After pulling hairs and cursing the box, you eventually dial 1-800-100-1364 to share your plight, resulting in more revenue for Cisco & you end up drinking more beer than you usually do in a bad manner. After all, a frustrated tinkerer is a good customer.

Coming to the point, Cisco has xConfig running over standard bash, which is more or less a limited configuration mode so that you can recover the device. But heck, since it was booting without it, I configured "rootsettings on Cisc0" , logged out and logged in as root with Cisc0 as password & jumped into a bash shell over Linux 3.4. Some more exploring and found  the environment was pretty loaded on factory defaults ; (as compared to trimmed, hardened network devices I have seen), heck, its having Python 2.6 :)

Not wasting anytime I configured the box with a static IP & tried upgrading it with 7.x code, which as expected failed. Upgrade gave unable to create squashfs on dmesg, at that moment I pretty much sighed & handed over things to Cisco Collab guy. I was already unimpressed with its poor recovery capabilities & time would not permit any more r&d on a production device.

Note to self: need to get my hands dirty once its dismounted.

~ lundi 9 mars 2015 0 commentaires

Are Cisco Products Really Safe? What is Vulnerable?

In the wake of the recent Heartbleed security scares, it can be difficult to keep track of all the potential security risks along with how they might affect you. Several companies have already issued statements to customers to let them know that the vulnerability has been patched and what they can do to ensure their personal data remains un-compromised.





Others, such as Cisco, discovered that the exploit affects their hardware as well as their website which can be a much more difficult problem to solve as it requires each of the individual devices to be updated on their own. Cisco published a list of vulnerable devices, but by their own admission, they have not finished analyzing all of their equipment yet. Here are some of their more popular devices and how their vulnerability might affect you:

Routers - A router is a devices that controls the transfer of data between two or more computers. It receives data from one device and then routes it to its intended destination. It functions like an air traffic controller, directing information along it’s appropriate path. The Cisco routers that are vulnerable could allow outside access to your entire network. Your security is only as strong as your weakest link, and as a router is sort of a hub for all inter computer communication it could expose private data or security keys that are used during the transfer process.

Switches - A network switch is a device to physically connect a network of computers. Different than a hub, which broadcasts the information to be transferred across all ports, the switch is able to specifically identify each machine on the network and send data only from one specific machine to another specific machine. A hacker who gained access to the switch would not even need to be physically connected as he could gain entry via any of the computers connected to it. It would require a second vulnerable point, however, which does reduce its threat to your system’s security somewhat. Once hacked it would provide access to all networked devices and their specific identification information, along with any data being transferred between any attached device.

Access Points - An access point is generally wireless and connects via hardwire to an existing network while allowing other devices to connect to the same network using a wireless connection. All WiFi setups use an access point to give users access to the Internet. While convenient, it relies on encryption technology to restrict outside access to a network. The vulnerability could allow any hacker within physical range to enter the network and gain access to the entire network of connected devices. It would allow access to all data being transferred, as well as potentially any data stored on any connected devices as well, depending on their own individual security.

Firewalls -  A firewall is essentially a software or hardware based security barrier made up of rules that decides how to handle all incoming and outgoing traffic between a secured and unsecured network, such as the Internet. It is essentially the equivalent of putting up a moat that forces all traffic to be considered and approved before being allowed to pass through the wall. Recently, it was revealed that the NSA has what is essentially a permanent backdoor into Cisco firewalls. All Cisco hardware must legally allow for the potential need for wiretapping and certain conditions are integrated into the internal software of a device, though most are never used. Though it seems that as long as these systems are in place, the NSA can upload and update their particular exploit allowing access through a normally impassible firewall.

Overall, whether you are exposed or not depends on which specific Cisco devices your company has. Some of them are not vulnerable at all to the Heartbleed exploit while others are until they are patched. Cisco may simply offer a replacement for your current device, or you may want to consider seeking alternatives in the meantime if none of the current solutions suit your needs.



Camille McClane is a writer, researcher and editor, who frequently blogs about about Cisco training and other computer repair-related subjects. Her favorite subject to focus on is emerging technology trends and its overall effect within business expansion and relations. She hopes the readers of eHacking.net enjoy this article as much as she enjoyed writing it. 

Image Source

~ mardi 29 avril 2014 0 commentaires

Oops..NSA did it again - How NSA hacked & (may have) got into *every* communicating device ever

Happy new year folks, I am late & I know it, but there is something that I just came across & thought to share it with you. Its

Read at leakedpress / Spiegel, posting from Leakedpress . If this is true (which it probably is. otherwise Snowden would not be hiding), then its something to either fear or marvel at. In both cases, I would love to see these devices in action as its something which catches my expertise and eye.

Read on..

SPIEGEL:
After years of speculation that electronics can be accessed by intelligence agencies through a back door, an internal NSA catalog reveals that such methods already exist for numerous end-user devices.
When it comes to modern firewalls for corporate computer networks, the world’s second largest network equipment manufacturer doesn’t skimp on praising its own work. According to Juniper Networks’ online PR copy, the company’s products are “ideal” for protecting large companies and computing centers from unwanted access from outside. They claim the performance of the company’s special computers is “unmatched” and their firewalls are the “best-in-class.” Despite these assurances, though, there is one attacker none of these products can fend off — the United States’ National Security Agency.
Specialists at the intelligence organization succeeded years ago in penetrating the company’s digital firewalls. A document viewed by SPIEGEL resembling a product catalog reveals that an NSA division called ANT has burrowed its way into nearly all the security architecture made by the major players in the industry — including American global market leader Cisco and its Chinese competitor Huawei, but also producers of mass-market goods, such as US computer-maker Dell and Apple’s iPhone.

These NSA agents, who specialize in secret back doors, are able to keep an eye on all levels of our digital lives — from computing centers to individual computers, from laptops to mobile phones. For nearly every lock, ANT seems to have a key in its toolbox. And no matter what walls companies erect, the NSA’s specialists seem already to have gotten past them.
This, at least, is the impression gained from flipping through the 50-page document. The list reads like a mail-order catalog, one from which other NSA employees can order technologies from the ANT division for tapping their targets’ data. The catalog even lists the prices for these electronic break-in tools, with costs ranging from free to $250,000.
In the case of Juniper, the name of this particular digital lock pick is “FEEDTROUGH.” This malware burrows into Juniper firewalls and makes it possible to smuggle other NSA programs into mainframe computers. Thanks to FEEDTROUGH, these implants can, by design, even survive “across reboots and software upgrades.” In this way, US government spies can secure themselves a permanent presence in computer networks. The catalog states that FEEDTROUGH “has been deployed on many target platforms.”
The specialists at ANT, which presumably stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology, could be described as master carpenters for the NSA’s department for Tailored Access Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice, ANT workers step in with their special tools, penetrating networking equipment, monitoring mobile phones and computers and diverting or even modifying data. Such “implants,” as they are referred to in NSA parlance, have played a considerable role in the intelligence agency’s ability to establish a global covert network that operates alongside the Internet.
Some of the equipment available is quite inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed on the targeted monitor,” for example, is available for just $30. But an “active GSM base station” — a tool that makes it possible to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor cell phones — costs a full $40,000. Computer bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs, capable of sending and receiving data via radio undetected, are available in packs of 50 for over $1 million.
The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture surveillance hardware. It also develops software for special tasks. The ANT developers have a clear preference for planting their malicious code in so-called BIOS, software located on a computer’s motherboard that is the first thing to load when a computer is turned on.
This has a number of valuable advantages: an infected PC or server appears to be functioning normally, so the infection remains invisible to virus protection and other security programs. And even if the hard drive of an infected computer has been completely erased and a new operating system is installed, the ANT malware can continue to function and ensures that new spyware can once again be loaded onto what is presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT developers call this “Persistence” and believe this approach has provided them with the possibility of permanent access.
Another program attacks the firmware in hard drives manufactured by Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which, with the exception of latter, are American companies. Here, too, it appears the US intelligence agency is compromising the technology and products of American companies.
Other ANT programs target Internet routers meant for professional use or hardware firewalls intended to protect company networks from online attacks. Many digital attack weapons are “remotely installable” — in other words, over the Internet. Others require a direct attack on an end-user device — an “interdiction,” as it is known in NSA jargon — in order to install malware or bugging equipment.
There is no information in the documents seen by SPIEGEL to suggest that the companies whose products are mentioned in the catalog provided any support to the NSA or even had any knowledge of the intelligence solutions. “Cisco does not work with any government to modify our equipment, nor to implement any so-called security ‘back doors’ in our products,” the company said in a statement. Contacted by SPIEGEL reporters, officials at Western Digital, Juniper Networks and Huawei also said they had no knowledge of any such modifications. Meanwhile, Dell officials said the company “respects and complies with the laws of all countries in which it operates.”
Many of the items in the software solutions catalog date from 2008, and some of the target server systems that are listed are no longer on the market today. At the same time, it’s not as if the hackers within the ANT division have been sleeping on the job. They have continued to develop their arsenal. Some pages in the 2008 catalog, for example, list new systems for which no tools yet exist. However, the authors promise they are already hard at work developing new tools and that they will be “pursued for a future release”.

You can read the full post here - http://www.theprohack.com/2014/02/nsa-hacks-every-network-device.html 

~ lundi 20 janvier 2014 0 commentaires

Ultimate Guide to run ASA 8.4 on GNS3 on Ubuntu - No more Qemu errors

Simulating CISCO ASA 8.4 on GNS3, on Ubuntu is a pain in the ass. Countless QEMU errors ,203 errors, results with no output on console and many more hair-pulling skull bashing events that *will* make you scratch your head and you will be motivated to buy an ASA for your personal use.
Yes folks..You will be running this..or a cousin of it.
But fear not weary travelers if you have reached at this point of web while surfing (read:hunting) for your share of ASA & firewall stuff, you are right at home. Today I will be providing a step by step almost error free guide of simulating ASA, and fret not, this has been tested on more than 5 platforms with zero error rate (and that included machines of different platform - i386,x86_64; and different flavors of Fedora/Ubuntu).

NOTE: I love linux but I hate Ubuntu, for my own personal reasons. I am a fedora guy & I love debian, but I hate Ubuntu.
Why I didnt covered this guide for Fedora  as Fedora guys will figure out how to do it anyways :P , its Ubuntu ones who were facing maximum issues (just google it) and hence I wanted to cover a guide for it. Jokes aside, I intend to cover the subjected issue as I faced multiple issue myself.

Never-mind, my machine as of now is an amd64 E350 based HP dm1 3210 Laptop with 4 GB ram. Its a pretty under powered PC for running GNS3 (as compared to dedicated rigs I have seen, however I can run IOU & NX-OS Titanium over it and it balances every known equation for me) but it does the job with some tweaking and the result is very satisfactory.

Coming to the point, you will be needing -
  1. A laptop/desktop
  2. Any Ubuntu flavor installed (I use backbox, its better than backtrack)
  3. ASA 8.4.x files (initrd and kernel files, if you are reading this article, I know you have them)
  4. Patience.
Step 1 -  Installing GNS3

Well this is simple, just type the commands and it will install safely. Make sure you dont have GNS3 installed previously else you might face some issues. Please note I am using compiling GNS3 for my 64 bit OS, however it should work for 32 but laptops too, make sure you choose correct version of dynamips from GNS3 website.
 rishabh@xion$cd /opt
 rishabh@xion$sudo mkdir GNS3
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ wget http://sourceforge.net/projects/gns-3/files/GNS3/0.8.3.1/GNS3-0.8.3.1-src.tar.gz
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ unzip GNS3-0.8.3.1-src.zip
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ sudo mv -f /GNS3-0.8.3.1-src/* /opt/GNS3
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ sudo chmod 777 GNS3
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ cd GNS3
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3$ sudo mkdir Dynamips Images Project Cache tmp
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3$ sudo chmod 777 Dynamips/ Images/ Project/ Cache/ tmp/
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3/Dynamips$ cd Dynamips/
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3/Dynamips$ http://sourceforge.net/projects/gns-3/files/Dynamips/0.2.8-RC3-community/dynamips-0.2.8-RC3-community-x86_64.bin
 rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3/Dynamips$ export PATH=$PATH:/opt/GNS3/GNS3-0.8.3.1-src/
Check if its installed by opening a terminal window and running GNS3. If it went well, proceed to next step.

Step 2 - Compiling and Patching QEMU

This is the second most crucial step, do as instructed, by the time you are finished, you will be presented with a stable installation of patched Qemu. Make sure NO previous installation of Qemu in installed on your machine.
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3$ wget http://download.savannah.gnu.org/releases/qemu/qemu-0.11.0.tar.gz
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3$tar xvzf qemu-0.11.0.tar.gz
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3$cd qemu-0.11.0
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$wget http://downloads.sourceforge.net/gns-3/qemu-0.11.0-olive.patch?download
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$patch -p1 -i qemu-0.11.0-olive.patch
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$./configure --target-list=i386_softmmu
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$make
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$sudo make install
Once its installed, check by running
rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$ which qemu
/usr/local/bin/qemu
It should display Qemu path, if not, you screwed up some where. Do it again.

Step 3 - Preliminary Configuration

In general settings of GNS3, you will find Qemuwrapper is already configured, double check Qemu & Qemu-img path here, it should be the same as mentioned in "which" command output or better if you have placed the same it in GNS3 folder

Also, Set ASA options as
 Qemu Options:
 -vnc none -vga none -m 1024 -icount auto -hdachs 980,16,32
 Kernel cmd line:
 -append ide_generic.probe_mask=0x01 ide_core.chs=0.0:980,16,32 auto nousb console=ttyS0,9600 bigphysarea=65536
Browse to the initrd & kernel images of ASA and set memory to 1024, once done, save it.

make sure your configuration looks like this




When done, its execution time follks :)

Step 4 - Running it.

Well..it will look like this.



You can also check the ps output of Qemu (quick and dirty output here..nothing flashy)
rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3$ ps ax | grep 'qemu'
 7094 pts/0    Sl+    0:00 /usr/bin/python /opt/GNS3/GNS3-0.8.3.1-src/qemuwrapper/qemuwrapper.py --listen 127.0.0.1 --port 10525 --no-path-check
 7101 pts/0    SN+    0:00 /bin/sh -c /usr/local/bin/qemu -name ASA1 -m 1024 -hda "/tmp/ASA1/FLASH" -kernel "/home/rishabh/Documents/asa842-vmlinuz" -initrd "/home/rishabh/Documents/asa842-initrd" -append "-append ide_generic.probe_mask=0x01 ide_core.chs=0.0:980,16,32 auto nousb console=ttyS0,9600 bigphysarea=65536" -net nic,vlan=0,macaddr=00:00:ab:40:a4:00,model=e1000 -net nic,vlan=1,macaddr=00:00:ab:8d:12:01,model=e1000 -net nic,vlan=2,macaddr=00:00:ab:f0:c0:02,model=e1000 -serial telnet:127.0.0.1:3001,server,nowait -vnc none -vga none -m 1024 -icount auto -hdachs 980,16,32
 7102 pts/0    R+     0:19 /usr/local/bin/qemu -name ASA1 -m 1024 -hda /tmp/ASA1/FLASH -kernel /home/rishabh/Documents/asa842-vmlinuz -initrd /home/rishabh/Documents/asa842-initrd -append -append ide_generic.probe_mask=0x01 ide_core.chs=0.0:980,16,32 auto nousb console=ttyS0,9600 bigphysarea=65536 -net nic,vlan=0,macaddr=00:00:ab:40:a4:00,model=e1000 -net nic,vlan=1,macaddr=00:00:ab:8d:12:01,model=e1000 -net nic,vlan=2,macaddr=00:00:ab:f0:c0:02,model=e1000 -serial telnet:127.0.0.1:3001,server,nowait -vnc none -vga none -m 1024 -icount auto -hdachs 980,16,32
 7175 pts/1    S+     0:00 grep --color=auto qemu
Once you are up and running, its time to grab a can of redbull (or beer if you prefer) and get a pat on your back, good work soldier :)

Miscellaneous Errors , which you *just might* encounter and how to deal with them.

If you followed my steps, I dont think you will encounter any errors, but for the sake of completeness, I am including the most basic errors which you might get.

"qemuwrapper path doesn't exist"
This one is a classic one. With proper GNS3 0.8.3x installation, you will *not* encounter it. If you are running classic 0.7.x build, God save you. Even if you have 0.8.3.x & still get this error , find Qemuwrapper (it will be there in one of GNS3 source folders) and select it, save it. Error gone. Make sure permissions are correct.

 "203-Bad number of parameters (5 with min/max=6/6)"
 Upgrade your GNS from 0.7x.x to 0.8.3, if you are following this guide, you should not get this error.

 "You are running an old and unpatched version of qemu"
Now here things get interesting. In one case I installed Qemu before installing GNS3 and I got this error quite frequently. I uninstalled Qemu, cleared my /tmp & I then first installed GNS3 and then installed Qemu after configuring GNS3 fully (except the Qemu part that is) . Did a sudo make install for Qemu and restarted my laptop. Please note I am using Qemu 0.11
Ran GNS3 and tada..



This error will be rectified.

 "You must use 'manual mode' to connect a link with a xyz module"
 Simple as hell, use manual mode..duh..

 "QEMU boots but no ASA boot output on console"
 Use correct QEMU binary, no Qemu_i386 / Qemu_x86_64. Use only correctly patched Qemu 0.11 binary in GNS3 like previously specified.

In all cases, all errors are either will be some permutation or combination of the mentioned ones. Well , it summarizes my post on running ASA, hope it will help you.

Rishabh Dangwal


~ vendredi 3 mai 2013 0 commentaires

Cisco Type 4 Passwords cracked–Coding mistake endangers devices

Cisco has issued a security advisory intimating that its new password hashing algorithm TYPE 4 is vulnerable,which allows Cisco TYPE 4 encoded hashes to be cracked easily. TYPE 4 is an update of TYPE 5 , and was supposed to salt passwords and apply 1000 iterations of SHA-256 .  Well, engineers at Cisco actually miscoded the algorithm by forgetting to salt passwords and setting the number of iterations to 1 which makes it even weaker than TYPE 5 algorithm .

“This approach causes a Type 4 password to be less resilient to brute-force attacks than a Type 5 password of equivalent complexity.”

Also, the code base (CISCO IOS 15) also disables TYPE 5 encryption on devices. Well..talk about rubbing salt on wounds.

Cisco Type 4 Passwords cracked–Coding misfire endangers hardware - - TheProhack.com

As per advisory -

"A device running a Cisco IOS or IOS XE release with support for Type 4 passwords lost the capability to create a Type 5 password from a user-provided plaintext password.Backward compatibility problems may arise when downgrading from a device running a Cisco IOS or IOS XE release with Type 4 password support and Type 4 passwords configured to a Cisco IOS or Cisco IOS XE release that does not support Type 4 passwords. Depending on the specific device configuration, the administrator may not be able to log in to the device or to change into privileged EXEC mode, requiring a password recovery process to be performed."

It was meant to be discovered inevitably. Folks at Hashcat - Philipp Schmidt and Jens Steube found it and were able to decode a hash posted at inetpro.org . Since hashes were weak, the information was more than enough to crack millions of hashes in hours if anyone gets their hands on hashes. 

The aftermath ? Cisco says it will be creating new password type to counter it with new as of now unknown commands to implement it.  In the meantime, Cisco says you “may” want to replace Type 4 password with Type 5 , as quoted -

There are two options to generate a Type 5 password:

  • Using another device running a Cisco IOS or Cisco IOS XE release without Type 4 support
  • Using the openssl command-line tool (part of the OpenSSL Project)

You can read the advisory here

You might also want to read  -


~ dimanche 24 mars 2013 0 commentaires

NSA Hacks every networked devices on planet

 If this is true (which it probably is. otherwise Snowden would not be hiding), then its something to either fear or marvel at. In both cases, I would love to see these devices in action as its something which catches my expertise and eye.

Read on..

SPIEGEL:
After years of speculation that electronics can be accessed by intelligence agencies through a back door, an internal NSA catalog reveals that such methods already exist for numerous end-user devices.
When it comes to modern firewalls for corporate computer networks, the world’s second largest network equipment manufacturer doesn’t skimp on praising its own work. According to Juniper Networks’ online PR copy, the company’s products are “ideal” for protecting large companies and computing centers from unwanted access from outside. They claim the performance of the company’s special computers is “unmatched” and their firewalls are the “best-in-class.” Despite these assurances, though, there is one attacker none of these products can fend off — the United States’ National Security Agency.
Specialists at the intelligence organization succeeded years ago in penetrating the company’s digital firewalls. A document viewed by SPIEGEL resembling a product catalog reveals that an NSA division called ANT has burrowed its way into nearly all the security architecture made by the major players in the industry — including American global market leader Cisco and its Chinese competitor Huawei, but also producers of mass-market goods, such as US computer-maker Dell and Apple’s iPhone.

These NSA agents, who specialize in secret back doors, are able to keep an eye on all levels of our digital lives — from computing centers to individual computers, from laptops to mobile phones. For nearly every lock, ANT seems to have a key in its toolbox. And no matter what walls companies erect, the NSA’s specialists seem already to have gotten past them.
This, at least, is the impression gained from flipping through the 50-page document. The list reads like a mail-order catalog, one from which other NSA employees can order technologies from the ANT division for tapping their targets’ data. The catalog even lists the prices for these electronic break-in tools, with costs ranging from free to $250,000.
In the case of Juniper, the name of this particular digital lock pick is “FEEDTROUGH.” This malware burrows into Juniper firewalls and makes it possible to smuggle other NSA programs into mainframe computers. Thanks to FEEDTROUGH, these implants can, by design, even survive “across reboots and software upgrades.” In this way, US government spies can secure themselves a permanent presence in computer networks. The catalog states that FEEDTROUGH “has been deployed on many target platforms.”
The specialists at ANT, which presumably stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology, could be described as master carpenters for the NSA’s department for Tailored Access Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice, ANT workers step in with their special tools, penetrating networking equipment, monitoring mobile phones and computers and diverting or even modifying data. Such “implants,” as they are referred to in NSA parlance, have played a considerable role in the intelligence agency’s ability to establish a global covert network that operates alongside the Internet.
Some of the equipment available is quite inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed on the targeted monitor,” for example, is available for just $30. But an “active GSM base station” — a tool that makes it possible to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor cell phones — costs a full $40,000. Computer bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs, capable of sending and receiving data via radio undetected, are available in packs of 50 for over $1 million.
The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture surveillance hardware. It also develops software for special tasks. The ANT developers have a clear preference for planting their malicious code in so-called BIOS, software located on a computer’s motherboard that is the first thing to load when a computer is turned on.
This has a number of valuable advantages: an infected PC or server appears to be functioning normally, so the infection remains invisible to virus protection and other security programs. And even if the hard drive of an infected computer has been completely erased and a new operating system is installed, the ANT malware can continue to function and ensures that new spyware can once again be loaded onto what is presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT developers call this “Persistence” and believe this approach has provided them with the possibility of permanent access.
Another program attacks the firmware in hard drives manufactured by Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which, with the exception of latter, are American companies. Here, too, it appears the US intelligence agency is compromising the technology and products of American companies.
Other ANT programs target Internet routers meant for professional use or hardware firewalls intended to protect company networks from online attacks. Many digital attack weapons are “remotely installable” — in other words, over the Internet. Others require a direct attack on an end-user device — an “interdiction,” as it is known in NSA jargon — in order to install malware or bugging equipment.
There is no information in the documents seen by SPIEGEL to suggest that the companies whose products are mentioned in the catalog provided any support to the NSA or even had any knowledge of the intelligence solutions. “Cisco does not work with any government to modify our equipment, nor to implement any so-called security ‘back doors’ in our products,” the company said in a statement. Contacted by SPIEGEL reporters, officials at Western Digital, Juniper Networks and Huawei also said they had no knowledge of any such modifications. Meanwhile, Dell officials said the company “respects and complies with the laws of all countries in which it operates.”
Many of the items in the software solutions catalog date from 2008, and some of the target server systems that are listed are no longer on the market today. At the same time, it’s not as if the hackers within the ANT division have been sleeping on the job. They have continued to develop their arsenal. Some pages in the 2008 catalog, for example, list new systems for which no tools yet exist. However, the authors promise they are already hard at work developing new tools and that they will be “pursued for a future release”.
nsa-ant-deitybounce
nsa-ant-ironchef
nsa-ant-feedthrough
nsa-ant-gourmettrough
nsa-ant-halluxwater
nsa-ant-jetplow
nsa-ant-souffletrough
nsa-ant-headwater
nsa-ant-schoolmontana
nsa-ant-sierramontana
nsa-ant-stuccomontana
nsa-ant-ctx4000
nsa-ant-loudauto
nsa-ant-nightstand
nsa-ant-nightwatch
nsa-ant-photoanglo
nsa-ant-sparrow-ii
nsa-ant-tawdryyard
nsa-ant-ginsu
nsa-ant-howlermonkey
nsa-ant-iratemonk
nsa-ant-juniormint
nsa-ant-maestro-ii
nsa-ant-somberknave
nsa-ant-swap
nsa-ant-trinity
nsa-ant-wistfultoll
nsa-ant-surlyspawn
nsa-ant-dropoutjeep
nsa-ant-gopherset
nsa-ant-monkeycalendar
nsa-ant-picasso
nsa-ant-totechaser
nsa-ant-toteghostly-2.0
nsa-ant-candygram
nsa-ant-crossbeam
nsa-ant-cyclone-hx9
nsa-ant-ebsr
nsa-ant-entourage
nsa-ant-genesis
nsa-ant-nebula
nsa-ant-typhon-hx
nsa-ant-waterwitch
nsa-ant-cottonmouth-i
nsa-ant-cottonmouth-ii
nsa-ant-cottonomouth-iii
nsa-ant-firewalk
nsa-ant-ragemaster

~ mercredi 2 janvier 2013 0 commentaires