Layer 2 Security Issues and Their Mitigation
Comments are very much welcome.
SPIEGEL:
After years of speculation that electronics can be accessed by intelligence agencies through a back door, an internal NSA catalog reveals that such methods already exist for numerous end-user devices.
When it comes to modern firewalls for corporate computer networks, the world’s second largest network equipment manufacturer doesn’t skimp on praising its own work. According to Juniper Networks’ online PR copy, the company’s products are “ideal” for protecting large companies and computing centers from unwanted access from outside. They claim the performance of the company’s special computers is “unmatched” and their firewalls are the “best-in-class.” Despite these assurances, though, there is one attacker none of these products can fend off — the United States’ National Security Agency.
Specialists at the intelligence organization succeeded years ago in penetrating the company’s digital firewalls. A document viewed by SPIEGEL resembling a product catalog reveals that an NSA division called ANT has burrowed its way into nearly all the security architecture made by the major players in the industry — including American global market leader Cisco and its Chinese competitor Huawei, but also producers of mass-market goods, such as US computer-maker Dell and Apple’s iPhone.
These NSA agents, who specialize in secret back doors, are able to keep an eye on all levels of our digital lives — from computing centers to individual computers, from laptops to mobile phones. For nearly every lock, ANT seems to have a key in its toolbox. And no matter what walls companies erect, the NSA’s specialists seem already to have gotten past them.
This, at least, is the impression gained from flipping through the 50-page document. The list reads like a mail-order catalog, one from which other NSA employees can order technologies from the ANT division for tapping their targets’ data. The catalog even lists the prices for these electronic break-in tools, with costs ranging from free to $250,000.
In the case of Juniper, the name of this particular digital lock pick is “FEEDTROUGH.” This malware burrows into Juniper firewalls and makes it possible to smuggle other NSA programs into mainframe computers. Thanks to FEEDTROUGH, these implants can, by design, even survive “across reboots and software upgrades.” In this way, US government spies can secure themselves a permanent presence in computer networks. The catalog states that FEEDTROUGH “has been deployed on many target platforms.”
The specialists at ANT, which presumably stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology, could be described as master carpenters for the NSA’s department for Tailored Access Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice, ANT workers step in with their special tools, penetrating networking equipment, monitoring mobile phones and computers and diverting or even modifying data. Such “implants,” as they are referred to in NSA parlance, have played a considerable role in the intelligence agency’s ability to establish a global covert network that operates alongside the Internet.
Some of the equipment available is quite inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed on the targeted monitor,” for example, is available for just $30. But an “active GSM base station” — a tool that makes it possible to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor cell phones — costs a full $40,000. Computer bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs, capable of sending and receiving data via radio undetected, are available in packs of 50 for over $1 million.
The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture surveillance hardware. It also develops software for special tasks. The ANT developers have a clear preference for planting their malicious code in so-called BIOS, software located on a computer’s motherboard that is the first thing to load when a computer is turned on.
This has a number of valuable advantages: an infected PC or server appears to be functioning normally, so the infection remains invisible to virus protection and other security programs. And even if the hard drive of an infected computer has been completely erased and a new operating system is installed, the ANT malware can continue to function and ensures that new spyware can once again be loaded onto what is presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT developers call this “Persistence” and believe this approach has provided them with the possibility of permanent access.
Another program attacks the firmware in hard drives manufactured by Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which, with the exception of latter, are American companies. Here, too, it appears the US intelligence agency is compromising the technology and products of American companies.
Other ANT programs target Internet routers meant for professional use or hardware firewalls intended to protect company networks from online attacks. Many digital attack weapons are “remotely installable” — in other words, over the Internet. Others require a direct attack on an end-user device — an “interdiction,” as it is known in NSA jargon — in order to install malware or bugging equipment.
There is no information in the documents seen by SPIEGEL to suggest that the companies whose products are mentioned in the catalog provided any support to the NSA or even had any knowledge of the intelligence solutions. “Cisco does not work with any government to modify our equipment, nor to implement any so-called security ‘back doors’ in our products,” the company said in a statement. Contacted by SPIEGEL reporters, officials at Western Digital, Juniper Networks and Huawei also said they had no knowledge of any such modifications. Meanwhile, Dell officials said the company “respects and complies with the laws of all countries in which it operates.”
Many of the items in the software solutions catalog date from 2008, and some of the target server systems that are listed are no longer on the market today. At the same time, it’s not as if the hackers within the ANT division have been sleeping on the job. They have continued to develop their arsenal. Some pages in the 2008 catalog, for example, list new systems for which no tools yet exist. However, the authors promise they are already hard at work developing new tools and that they will be “pursued for a future release”.
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| Yes folks..You will be running this..or a cousin of it. |
NOTE: I love linux but I hate Ubuntu, for my own personal reasons. I am a fedora guy & I love debian, but I hate Ubuntu.
Why I didnt covered this guide for Fedora as Fedora guys will figure out how to do it anyways :P , its Ubuntu ones who were facing maximum issues (just google it) and hence I wanted to cover a guide for it. Jokes aside, I intend to cover the subjected issue as I faced multiple issue myself.
rishabh@xion$cd /optCheck if its installed by opening a terminal window and running GNS3. If it went well, proceed to next step.
rishabh@xion$sudo mkdir GNS3
rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ wget http://sourceforge.net/projects/gns-3/files/GNS3/0.8.3.1/GNS3-0.8.3.1-src.tar.gz
rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ unzip GNS3-0.8.3.1-src.zip
rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ sudo mv -f /GNS3-0.8.3.1-src/* /opt/GNS3
rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ sudo chmod 777 GNS3
rishabh@xi0n:/opt$ cd GNS3
rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3$ sudo mkdir Dynamips Images Project Cache tmp
rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3$ sudo chmod 777 Dynamips/ Images/ Project/ Cache/ tmp/
rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3/Dynamips$ cd Dynamips/
rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3/Dynamips$ http://sourceforge.net/projects/gns-3/files/Dynamips/0.2.8-RC3-community/dynamips-0.2.8-RC3-community-x86_64.bin
rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3/Dynamips$ export PATH=$PATH:/opt/GNS3/GNS3-0.8.3.1-src/
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3$ wget http://download.savannah.gnu.org/releases/qemu/qemu-0.11.0.tar.gzOnce its installed, check by running
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3$tar xvzf qemu-0.11.0.tar.gz
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3$cd qemu-0.11.0
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$wget http://downloads.sourceforge.net/gns-3/qemu-0.11.0-olive.patch?download
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$patch -p1 -i qemu-0.11.0-olive.patch
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$./configure --target-list=i386_softmmu
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$make
rishabh@xion:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$sudo make install
rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3/qemu/qemu-0.11.0$ which qemuIt should display Qemu path, if not, you screwed up some where. Do it again.
/usr/local/bin/qemu
Qemu Options:Browse to the initrd & kernel images of ASA and set memory to 1024, once done, save it.
-vnc none -vga none -m 1024 -icount auto -hdachs 980,16,32
Kernel cmd line:
-append ide_generic.probe_mask=0x01 ide_core.chs=0.0:980,16,32 auto nousb console=ttyS0,9600 bigphysarea=65536
rishabh@xi0n:/opt/GNS3$ ps ax | grep 'qemu'Once you are up and running, its time to grab a can of redbull (or beer if you prefer) and get a pat on your back, good work soldier :)
7094 pts/0 Sl+ 0:00 /usr/bin/python /opt/GNS3/GNS3-0.8.3.1-src/qemuwrapper/qemuwrapper.py --listen 127.0.0.1 --port 10525 --no-path-check
7101 pts/0 SN+ 0:00 /bin/sh -c /usr/local/bin/qemu -name ASA1 -m 1024 -hda "/tmp/ASA1/FLASH" -kernel "/home/rishabh/Documents/asa842-vmlinuz" -initrd "/home/rishabh/Documents/asa842-initrd" -append "-append ide_generic.probe_mask=0x01 ide_core.chs=0.0:980,16,32 auto nousb console=ttyS0,9600 bigphysarea=65536" -net nic,vlan=0,macaddr=00:00:ab:40:a4:00,model=e1000 -net nic,vlan=1,macaddr=00:00:ab:8d:12:01,model=e1000 -net nic,vlan=2,macaddr=00:00:ab:f0:c0:02,model=e1000 -serial telnet:127.0.0.1:3001,server,nowait -vnc none -vga none -m 1024 -icount auto -hdachs 980,16,32
7102 pts/0 R+ 0:19 /usr/local/bin/qemu -name ASA1 -m 1024 -hda /tmp/ASA1/FLASH -kernel /home/rishabh/Documents/asa842-vmlinuz -initrd /home/rishabh/Documents/asa842-initrd -append -append ide_generic.probe_mask=0x01 ide_core.chs=0.0:980,16,32 auto nousb console=ttyS0,9600 bigphysarea=65536 -net nic,vlan=0,macaddr=00:00:ab:40:a4:00,model=e1000 -net nic,vlan=1,macaddr=00:00:ab:8d:12:01,model=e1000 -net nic,vlan=2,macaddr=00:00:ab:f0:c0:02,model=e1000 -serial telnet:127.0.0.1:3001,server,nowait -vnc none -vga none -m 1024 -icount auto -hdachs 980,16,32
7175 pts/1 S+ 0:00 grep --color=auto qemu
Cisco has issued a security advisory intimating that its new password hashing algorithm TYPE 4 is vulnerable,which allows Cisco TYPE 4 encoded hashes to be cracked easily. TYPE 4 is an update of TYPE 5 , and was supposed to salt passwords and apply 1000 iterations of SHA-256 . Well, engineers at Cisco actually miscoded the algorithm by forgetting to salt passwords and setting the number of iterations to 1 which makes it even weaker than TYPE 5 algorithm .
“This approach causes a Type 4 password to be less resilient to brute-force attacks than a Type 5 password of equivalent complexity.”
Also, the code base (CISCO IOS 15) also disables TYPE 5 encryption on devices. Well..talk about rubbing salt on wounds.
As per advisory -
"A device running a Cisco IOS or IOS XE release with support for Type 4 passwords lost the capability to create a Type 5 password from a user-provided plaintext password.Backward compatibility problems may arise when downgrading from a device running a Cisco IOS or IOS XE release with Type 4 password support and Type 4 passwords configured to a Cisco IOS or Cisco IOS XE release that does not support Type 4 passwords. Depending on the specific device configuration, the administrator may not be able to log in to the device or to change into privileged EXEC mode, requiring a password recovery process to be performed."
It was meant to be discovered inevitably. Folks at Hashcat - Philipp Schmidt and Jens Steube found it and were able to decode a hash posted at inetpro.org . Since hashes were weak, the information was more than enough to crack millions of hashes in hours if anyone gets their hands on hashes.
The aftermath ? Cisco says it will be creating new password type to counter it with new as of now unknown commands to implement it. In the meantime, Cisco says you “may” want to replace Type 4 password with Type 5 , as quoted -
There are two options to generate a Type 5 password:
- Using another device running a Cisco IOS or Cisco IOS XE release without Type 4 support
- Using the openssl command-line tool (part of the OpenSSL Project)
You can read the advisory here
You might also want to read -
SPIEGEL:
After years of speculation that electronics can be accessed by intelligence agencies through a back door, an internal NSA catalog reveals that such methods already exist for numerous end-user devices.
When it comes to modern firewalls for corporate computer networks, the world’s second largest network equipment manufacturer doesn’t skimp on praising its own work. According to Juniper Networks’ online PR copy, the company’s products are “ideal” for protecting large companies and computing centers from unwanted access from outside. They claim the performance of the company’s special computers is “unmatched” and their firewalls are the “best-in-class.” Despite these assurances, though, there is one attacker none of these products can fend off — the United States’ National Security Agency.
Specialists at the intelligence organization succeeded years ago in penetrating the company’s digital firewalls. A document viewed by SPIEGEL resembling a product catalog reveals that an NSA division called ANT has burrowed its way into nearly all the security architecture made by the major players in the industry — including American global market leader Cisco and its Chinese competitor Huawei, but also producers of mass-market goods, such as US computer-maker Dell and Apple’s iPhone.
These NSA agents, who specialize in secret back doors, are able to keep an eye on all levels of our digital lives — from computing centers to individual computers, from laptops to mobile phones. For nearly every lock, ANT seems to have a key in its toolbox. And no matter what walls companies erect, the NSA’s specialists seem already to have gotten past them.
This, at least, is the impression gained from flipping through the 50-page document. The list reads like a mail-order catalog, one from which other NSA employees can order technologies from the ANT division for tapping their targets’ data. The catalog even lists the prices for these electronic break-in tools, with costs ranging from free to $250,000.
In the case of Juniper, the name of this particular digital lock pick is “FEEDTROUGH.” This malware burrows into Juniper firewalls and makes it possible to smuggle other NSA programs into mainframe computers. Thanks to FEEDTROUGH, these implants can, by design, even survive “across reboots and software upgrades.” In this way, US government spies can secure themselves a permanent presence in computer networks. The catalog states that FEEDTROUGH “has been deployed on many target platforms.”
The specialists at ANT, which presumably stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology, could be described as master carpenters for the NSA’s department for Tailored Access Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice, ANT workers step in with their special tools, penetrating networking equipment, monitoring mobile phones and computers and diverting or even modifying data. Such “implants,” as they are referred to in NSA parlance, have played a considerable role in the intelligence agency’s ability to establish a global covert network that operates alongside the Internet.
Some of the equipment available is quite inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed on the targeted monitor,” for example, is available for just $30. But an “active GSM base station” — a tool that makes it possible to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor cell phones — costs a full $40,000. Computer bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs, capable of sending and receiving data via radio undetected, are available in packs of 50 for over $1 million.
The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture surveillance hardware. It also develops software for special tasks. The ANT developers have a clear preference for planting their malicious code in so-called BIOS, software located on a computer’s motherboard that is the first thing to load when a computer is turned on.
This has a number of valuable advantages: an infected PC or server appears to be functioning normally, so the infection remains invisible to virus protection and other security programs. And even if the hard drive of an infected computer has been completely erased and a new operating system is installed, the ANT malware can continue to function and ensures that new spyware can once again be loaded onto what is presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT developers call this “Persistence” and believe this approach has provided them with the possibility of permanent access.
Another program attacks the firmware in hard drives manufactured by Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which, with the exception of latter, are American companies. Here, too, it appears the US intelligence agency is compromising the technology and products of American companies.
Other ANT programs target Internet routers meant for professional use or hardware firewalls intended to protect company networks from online attacks. Many digital attack weapons are “remotely installable” — in other words, over the Internet. Others require a direct attack on an end-user device — an “interdiction,” as it is known in NSA jargon — in order to install malware or bugging equipment.
There is no information in the documents seen by SPIEGEL to suggest that the companies whose products are mentioned in the catalog provided any support to the NSA or even had any knowledge of the intelligence solutions. “Cisco does not work with any government to modify our equipment, nor to implement any so-called security ‘back doors’ in our products,” the company said in a statement. Contacted by SPIEGEL reporters, officials at Western Digital, Juniper Networks and Huawei also said they had no knowledge of any such modifications. Meanwhile, Dell officials said the company “respects and complies with the laws of all countries in which it operates.”
Many of the items in the software solutions catalog date from 2008, and some of the target server systems that are listed are no longer on the market today. At the same time, it’s not as if the hackers within the ANT division have been sleeping on the job. They have continued to develop their arsenal. Some pages in the 2008 catalog, for example, list new systems for which no tools yet exist. However, the authors promise they are already hard at work developing new tools and that they will be “pursued for a future release”.